Prof. Christoph Luelfesmann

Delegation Options

Christoph Luelfesmann currently works on the question of whether to delegate authority over the implementation of a binary project to an expert who possesses private information about the project’s value, or, to a supervisor who takes the sign and size of externalities into account. This issue is often relevant in modern Tech companies with their focus on small-team development work. The research shows that in absence of communication delegation is often valuable, but less so when the distribution of project payoffs improves. The possibility of cheap talk renders delegation spurious.
Mr Luelfesmann is an applied Micro theorist. He has published on issues of tax competition and labor mobility, fiscal federalism, and optimal contracting in firms.

Since 2003, he has been a Professor of Economics at Simon Fraser University in Vancouver, Canada. He previously worked as an Assistant at the University of Bonn, where he also earned his PhD in 1996 and habilitated in 2002. He is a Fellow of the CESifo Research Network.