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Prof. Olivier Bos

Panthéon-Assas University, Paris

Guest program

CES Visiting Scholar

Contact

LMU Munich
Center for Economic Studies (CES)
Schackstr. 4
80539 Munich, Germany

Room: 121

Visiting period:
23 Jan. - 28 Feb. 2018

Country

France

Summary

Signaling in Auctions

Publicly visible behavior concerns affect bidding behavior and the outcome in many auctions. A firm's performance in an auction, irrespectively whether of it wins or loses the auctions, is informative to market analysts and other market parties, about its profitability, financial situations, strategy or management quality. In a charity auction, bidders can be altruistic and get a warm glow from discreet contributions. Yet they can also care about their public image and therefore exploit signaling motives. Motives to buy art through an auction can derived from showing it to others. In these auctions, bidders not only care about their payment and about winning, but also about what the auction outcome reveals about themselves to outsiders. These inferences about the individual qualities of a bidder depend on the outcome and format of the auction, and in turn affect the equilibrium bidding strategies and thus the outcome of the auction.

Mr Bos's research interests are mainly theoretical and include works on auctions, market analysis and public economics, with their numerous fields of application, such as the formation of international environmental agreements, fundraising mechanisms and the art market.

Olivier Bos is an Associate Professor of Economics at the Panthéon-Assas University in Paris and a junior fellow at the Institut Universitaire de France as well as a ZEW Research Associate. Previously, he was a postdoctoral researcher at the University of Cologne. He received his PhD in 2009 from the Paris School of Economics and was a visiting PhD student at the University of Bonn and the Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) of the Université catholique de Louvain.

Lecture
Charitable and Fundraising Mechanism: Theory and Experimental Evidence (3 lectures)